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Abstract
The practice of valuation by marking-to-market with current trading
prices is seriously flawed. Under leverage the problem is particularly dra-
matic: due to the concave form of market impact, selling always initially
causes the expected leverage to increase. There is a critical leverage above
which it is impossible to exit a portfolio without leverage going to infinity
and bankruptcy becoming likely. Standard risk-management methods give
no warning of this problem, which easily occurs for aggressively leveraged
positions in illiquid markets. We propose an alternative accounting pro-
cedure based on the estimated market impact of liquidation that removes
the illusion of profit. This should curb the leverage cycle and contribute
to an enhanced stability of financial markets.
Another issue brought to the fore by the crisis is the need to better understand
the determinants of liquidity in financial markets. The notion that financial assets
can always be sold at prices close to their fundamental values is built into most
economic analysis...
Chairman Ben Bernanke, Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics,
Princeton, September 24th, 2010.
1 Introduction: The danger of marginal prices
Mark-to-market or “fair value” accounting is standard industry practice. It con-
sists in assigning a value to a position held in a financial instrument based on
the current market price for this instrument or similar instruments. This is jus-
tified by the theory of efficient markets, which posits that at any given time
market prices faithfully reflect all known information about the value of an asset.
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However, mark-to-market prices are only marginal prices, reflecting the value of
selling an infinitesimal number of shares.
Practitioners are typically concerned with selling more than an infinitesimal
number of shares, and are intuitively aware that this practice is flawed. Selling
has market impact, which depresses the price by an amount that increases with
the quantity sold. The first piece will be sold near the current price, but as more
is liquidated prices may drop substantially. This somewhat paradoxically implies
the value of 10 % of a company is less than 10 times the value of 1 % of that
company. We take advantage of what has been learned recently about market
impact to propose a method for impact-adjusted valuation that results in better
risk control than mark-to-market valuation. This is in line with other recent
proposals that valuation should be based on liquidation prices [1, 2].
Estimating liquidation prices requires a good understanding of market impact.
In recent years there is been considerable progress in both theory and practice.
For large trades there is growing evidence that market impact follows a universal
functional form, see e.g. [3, 4, 5]. By “large” we mean trades that exceed the
liquidity currently available in the order book; such trades need to be either
broken up into pieces and executed incrementally or executed in a block market.
Market impact is a concave function whose slope is infinite at the origin, which
means that small trades have a disproportionally large impact.
The need for a better alternative to marking to market is most evident with
leverage, i.e. when assets are purchased with borrowed money. Leverage ampli-
fies market impact. As a leveraged position is sold, a process we refer to here as
deleveraging, the price tends to drop due to market impact. Counter-intuitively,
due to the concave form of market impact, when a leveraged position is grad-
ually unwound the depression in prices due to impact overwhelms the decrease
in position size, and leverage initially rises rather than falls. When impact is
concave, this is not unusual – the expected leverage as a sale begins always goes
up, regardless of initial leverage, liquidity or position size.
As more of the position is sold, provided the initial leverage and initial position
are not too large, leverage eventually comes back down and the position retains
some of its value upon liquidation. However, as we show here, if the initial
leverage and initial position are too large, as the position is sold the leverage
diverges, and the resulting liquidation value is less than zero, i.e. the debt to the
creditors exceeds the resale value of the asset. The upshot is that under mark-
to-market accounting a leveraged position that appears to be worth billions of
dollars may predictably be worth less than nothing by the time it is liquidated.
The above scenario assumes that positions are exited in an orderly fashion; under
fire sale conditions or in very illiquid markets things are even worse.
From the point of view of a regulator or a risk manager this makes it clear
that an alternative to mark-to-market accounting is badly needed. Neglecting
impact allows huge positions on illiquid instruments to appear profitable when
it is actually not the case. We propose such an alternative based on the known
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functional form of market impact, and propose that valuations should be based on
the expected liquidation value of assets. Under leverage this avoids the problems
outlined above. Whereas mark-to-market valuation only indicates problems with
excessive leverage after they have occurred, our method makes them clear before
positions are entered. Thus our method gives clear indications about potential
problems as they are developing, and makes such situations easier to avoid. This
could be extremely useful for damping the leverage cycle and coping with pro-
cyclical behaviors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
In Section 2 we review the literature on market impact and present our pro-
posal for impacted-adjusted valuation. In Section 3 we apply this to leverage and
demonstrate that over-leveraging is a critical phenomenon, with a sharp transi-
tion where the problem of liquidating the position without bankruptcy becomes
serious. In Section 4 we present some alternative formulas for estimating impact,
run some numbers for typical assets, and show that this is not a serious problem
for really liquid assets such as stocks, but it can occur at surprisingly low lever-
ages for assets such as credit default swaps. Section 5 concludes, discussing the
broader implications for the theory of market efficiency.
2 Market impact and liquidation accounting
Accounting based on liquidation prices requires a quantitative model of market
impact. Because market impact is very noisy, and because it usually requires pro-
prietary data to study empirically, a good picture of market impact has emerged
only gradually in the literature. In this section we review what is known about
market impact and present our proposal for impact-adjusted valuation.
2.1 The emerging quantitative model of market impact
Understanding the nature of market impact has now been the focus of a large
number of empirical studies, both from academics and practitioners (for recent
reviews, see [11, 12, 3, 4, 13, 14, 5]), and a consensus is beginning to emerge. Here
we are particularly concerned with the liquidation of large positions, which must
either be sold in a block market or broken into pieces and executed incrementally1.
These empirical studies now make it clear that the market impact I = 〈ε · (pf −
p0)/p0〉, defined as the expected shift in price from the price p0 observed before a
buy trade (ε = +1) or a sell trade (ε = −1) to the price pf at which the last share
is executed, is a concave function of position size Q normalized by the trading
volume V . When liquidation occurs in normal conditions, i.e. at a reasonable
pace that does not attempt to remove liquidity too quickly from the order book,
1 Our interest in the impact of a single large trade that must be executed in pieces is in
contrast to the impact of a single small trade in the orderbook, or the impact of the average
order flow, both of which have different functional forms, see [12, 5].
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the expected impact I due to liquidating Q shares is
I(Q) = Y σ
√
Q
V
, (1)
where σ is the daily volatility, V is daily share transaction volume, and Y a
numerical constant of order unity [5]. We say more about how these parameters
should be estimated when this formula is used for regulatory purposes in the next
section.
Note that we are defining the expected impact in terms of prices rather than
log-prices. This is possible because for cases of interest the liquidation time T is
short enough for prices not to move significantly away from the initial price, and
the impact itself is significantly less than the price itself, so that the difference
between pf/p0 − 1 and ln(pf/p0) is small and only has a minor effect on our
conclusions. This means that the domain of validity for the formula requires that
the impact I(Q) not be too large, roughly less than 20%.
The quantity above is the expected impact, in the sense that it is the average
outcome of liquidating Q shares. This is superimposed on the background price
fluctuations due to the rest of the market. For typical small values of Q/V allow-
ing orderly execution, the realized market impact is very noisy, almost invisible
to the naked eye. It is not uncommon that the realized impact is in the opposite
direction of the average impact. The expected impact can be regarded either as
the average impact or as a median price – 50% of prices will be above it, and
50% below it.
We want to emphasize that here we have defined impact as the shift in prices
caused by the execution of given order. Whether the long-term impact has a per-
manent component that remains embedded in prices long after the trade occurs,
and how large such a component might be, remain controversial. Fortunately
these questions do not need to be addressed for our purposes here, although they
are highly relevant to understand how market prices move and how potentially
destabilising feedback loops can occur (see e.g [15]).
The earliest theory of market impact due to Kyle [16] predicted that expected
impact should be linear. This was further supported by the work of Huberman
and Stanzl [17], who argued that providing certain assumptions are met, such
as lack of correlation in order flow, impact has to be linear in order to avoid
arbitrage. However, more recent empirical studies have made it clear that these
assumptions are not met [18, 19, 5], and the overwhelming empirical evidence that
impact is concave has driven the development of alternative theories [20, 21, 22].
For example, Farmer et al. [23] have proposed a theory based on a strategic equi-
librium between liquidity demanders and liquidity providers, in which uncertainty
about Q on the part of liquidity providers dictates the functional form of the im-
pact. Toth et al. [5], in contrast, derive a square root impact function within
a stochastic order flow model. They impose that prices are diffusive, show that
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this implies a locally linear “latent order book”, and provide a proof-of-principle
using a simple agent-based model. Both of these theories predict roughly square
root impact, though with some differences.
Both empirical studies and theory make it clear that the square-root law for
expected impact under orderly execution also holds at intermediate points. That
is, after a quantity q ≤ Q is executed, the average adverse price move is given by
[14, 23, 5]:
I(q) = Y σ
√
q
V
, (2)
We should stress that the formulae above for market impact hold only under
normal conditions, when execution is slow enough for the order book to replenish
between successive trades (on this point, see e.g. [24, 25, 11]). If the execution
schedule is so aggressive that Q becomes comparable to V , liquidity may dry up,
in which case the parameters σ and V can no longer be considered to be fixed,
but themselves react to the trade, with an expected increase of the volatility
and a decrease of the liquidity. Impact in such extreme conditions is expected
to be much larger than the square-root formula above. The flash crash is a
good example. In these cases the expected impact becomes less concave and it
can become linear or even super-linear [22]. For the above impact formula to be
valid, the execution time T needs to be large enough that Q remains much smaller
than V (20% is a typical upper limit). The execution time should not be too long
either, otherwise impact is necessarily linear in Q: beyond some “memory time”
of the market, trades must necessarily become independent and impact must be
additive, see [5].
2.2 How should the impact parameters be estimated?
When impact is estimated for regulatory purposes, for stability reasons it is
important that the parameters should be computed over a long time horizon.
For example one can take an exponential moving average of σ and V over past
values. If σ and V are not measured over relatively long time scales impact-
adjusted valuation could lead to an unstable feedback loop. Imagine, for example,
an exogeneous shock (like the Japanese tsunami in March 2011) that leads to a
sudden increase of volatility. If σ is measured over short-time scales, the expected
impact I(Q) also increases. This would cause a larger discount on the asset
valuation, which could cause a systemic effect in which risk managers unload
the asset, leading to plummeting market prices and further panic. Similarly in a
temporary liquidity crisis a sudden drop of V could lead to a mechanical reduction
in asset values. In order to avoid these destabilising effects, the window over
which σ and V are computed should be chosen to be long, perhaps 6 months,
and exclude the very recent past – e.g. the last week of trading.
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2.3 Impact-adjusted accounting
The establishment of a quantitative theory for expected impact makes it possible
to do impact-adjusted accounting. Rather than using the mark-to-market price,
which is the marginal price of an infinitesimal liquidation, we propose using the
expected price under complete liquidation. For convenience we assume liquidation
in N equal sized increments of v shares each, where v is arbitrary but small2. The
expected value V of a position of Q shares in a given asset with mark-to-market
price p0 that is liquidated in N pieces of v shares each is
V(Q) =
N∑
t=1
vp0(1− I(vt)) (3)
Providing Q is large, it is a good approximation to use the continuous limit where
dq = v is infinitesimal, in which case this can be written
V(Q) =
∫ Q
0
p0(1− I(q))dq (4)
= p0Q(1− 2
3
Y σ
√
Q/V )
= p0Q(1− 2
3
I(Q))
It is sometimes also useful to use the average valuation price p˜ = V/Q = p0(1−
2
3
I(Q)).
3 The critical nature of leverage
When leverage is used it becomes particularly important to take impact into
account and value assets based on their expected liquidation prices. Consider an
asset manager taking on liabilities L to hold Q shares of an asset with price p.
For simplicity we consider the case of a single asset. The leverage λ is given by
the ratio of the value of the asset to the total equity,
λ =
Qp
Qp− L. (5)
Holding Q and L constant, the leverage decreases when the price of the asset
increases and vice versa when it decreases. Similarly, holding p and L constant,
selling q shares reduces leverage,
λ =
Qp
Qp− L → λ
′ =
(Q− q)p
(Q− q)p− L < λ if q > 0, (6)
and vice versa for buying.
2 In general it is possible that optimal liquidation might follow a different liquidation sched-
ule. However, our feeling is that any gains from such a schedule are likely to be small, and in
any case, empirical studies show that a uniform liquidation rate is a good approximation for
the average investor [14].
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3.1 Deleveraging
Now we take into account market impact and consider the case of deleveraging,
i.e. exiting a leveraged position. Selling pushes current trading prices down,
which under mark-to-market accounting decreases the value of the remaining
unsold shares. As we show, this generally overwhelms the effect of selling the
shares, increasing the leverage even as the overall position is reduced. After q
shares have been sold the amount of cash raised to offset the liabilites is C(q).
Using the continuous approximation
C(q) ≈
∫ q
0
dq′ p0 (1− I(q′)) = p0q
(
1− 2
3
I
√
q
Q
)
, (7)
where I ≡ I(Q) = Y σ
√
Q/V is the impact of selling the entire position, which
can be large if the initial position is too big and/or the liquidity is too small. The
leverage λ(q) after q shares have been sold is
λ(q) =
(Q− q)p(q)
(Q− q)p(q)− L+ C(q) , (8)
where p(q) is the price after selling q shares. Letting x = q/Q be the fraction
of assets that have been sold and λ0 be the initial leverage before selling begins,
this can be rewritten in the form
λ(x) = λ0
(
(1− x)(1− I√x)
1− λ0I√x (1− x/3)
)
. (9)
It is then easy to show that:
• For small x, λ(x) ≈ λ0 (1 + (λ0 − 1)I√x), which is larger than λ0 for λ0 >
1, that is, whenever any leverage is used. This means, rather paradoxically,
that when selling a leveraged position, the expected leverage under mark-to-
market accounting always initially increases.
• If λ0I < 3/2 the leverage λ(x) eventually reaches a maximum and decreases
back to one for x = 1. The crossover point x∗ where the leverage drops
below its starting value can be computed by solving Eq. (8) for x with
λ(q) = λ0, which gives
x∗ =
√√√√√1−√1− 43(λ0 − 1)(3− λ0)I2
(2− λ0/3)I . (10)
It is easy to show that x∗ < 1 whenever λ0I < 3/2.
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• If λ0I > 3/2 the leverage λ(x) diverges during liquidation. The leverage
diverges when the value of the position is equal to the liability, i.e. qp(q) =
L. This occurs when the denominator of Eq. (9) becomes zero, which
yields a cubic equation for the critical value x = xc. If xc < 1 then the
asset manager goes bankrupt before being able to take his position to zero.
Three representative deleveraging trajectories λ(x) are illustrated in Fig. 1, to-
gether with the trajectory obtained in absence of market impact. We assume a
fixed starting mark-to-market leverage λ0 = 9 and show three cases correspond-
ing to different values of the overall market impact parameter I. For the two
cases where the leverage is subcritical, i.e. with λ0I < 3/2, the manager unwinds
the position without bankruptcy. However, due to the rise in leverage during the
course of liquidation, he may get in serious trouble with his prime broker along
the way. For example, in the case where I = 0.15 at its peak λ(x) is more than
twice its starting value.
The case where the leverage is allowed to become supercritical is a disaster.
If λ0I > 3/2, which for λ0 = 9 implies I > 0.16, the manager is trapped, and
the likely outcome of attempting to deleverage is bankruptcy. (By bankruptcy we
mean that the position ends up being worth less than the money borrowed to
finance it, so that the manager ends up owing a debt for that position. )
3.2 Leverage under impact-adjusted prices
We now show how risk management is improved by impact-adjusted accounting.
This is done by simply using the average impact-adjusted valuation price p˜ in the
formula for leverage, i.e.
λ˜(q) =
qp˜(q)
qp˜(q)− L+ C(q) . (11)
Here 0 ≤ q ≤ Q is the number of shares held at any given time along the way
to entering position Q. We define the impact adjusted price for position q as
the liquidation price if buying were to stop and the current position q were to
be sold. Accordingly, when exiting a position we adopt the convention that the
impact-adjusted price is based on complete liquidation of all Q shares, i.e. we do
not allow for the possibility of pausing along the way3.
3 The square root law for market impact is inherently related to the market’s memory [23, 5].
Once liquidation begins the market has a memory – the response of prices to each successive
sale is smaller and smaller as Q − q gets bigger and bigger. An alternative definition of the
impact-adjusted price while the position is being sold might be to assume a pause sufficiently
long to break this memory, followed by subsequent liquidation of the remaining position q. We
have not adopted this because it requires an understanding of how impact decays in time, which
we do not have, and in any case we do not believe this is necessary.
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Figure 1: Possible deleveraging trajectories, showing the leverage λ(x) based on mark-to-
market accounting as a function of the fraction x of the position that has been liquidated. We
hold the initial leverage λ0 = 9 constant and show four trajectories for different values of the
market impact parameter I = I(Q) = Y σ√Q/V , i.e. I = 0 (black dashed line, corresponding
to the no-impact case) I = 0.1 (green dotted line), 0.15 (blue solid line), and 0.19 (red dotted-
dashed line). If the market impact is too high the leverage diverges before the position can be
liquidated, implying that the position is bankrupt.
In figure 2 we show how the leverage behaves when a manager first steadily
assumes a position 0 ≤ q(t) ≤ Q and then steadily liquidates it. We compare
three different notions of leverage:
• No impact leverage is represented by the dashed black line. This is the
leverage that would exist if the price remained constant (on average). It
rises and falls linearly4 proportional to the position q(t).
• Mark-to-market leverage is represented by the solid blue line. While the po-
sition is building it rises more slowly than linearly. This is because as the
position is building impact causes the price to increase, lowering leverage
and partially offsetting the increasing position size. This is dangerous be-
cause it artificially overestimates profits and therefore depresses leverage.
When the position is exited, in contrast, the expected leverage initially
shoots up. In the subcritical case it eventually returns to zero, but in
the super-critical case it diverges, indicating (too late) that the position is
bankrupt.
4 The reason for linearity is that when the price is constant the denominator in Eq. (5)
remains constant. This is because changes in cash cancel changes in asset value.
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Figure 2: Leverage as a function of position size for first entering and then exiting a position.
The position q(t) varies from 0 to Q in the left half of each panel and from Q to 0 in the right
half of each panel. Labels on the x axes denote the number of shares held by the asset manager
at the corresponding time. Three different measures are used for leverage. The dashed black
line shows what the leverage would be if there were no impact and the price didn’t change;
the solid blue line shows the leverage including impact under mark-to-market accounting, and
the dotted-dashed red line shows the leverage using impact-adjusted valuation. The left panel
is a case in which Q is small enough that the leverage never becomes critical; the right panel
is a case where the leverage becomes super-critical. In this case the impact-adjusted leverage
diverges as the position is entered, warning the manager of the impending disaster. The dashed
red vertical line shows the critical position qc.
• Impact-adjusted leverage is represented by the dashed red line. It is always
greater than either of the other two measures of leverage. It is particularly
useful in the super-critical case – its rapid increase is a clear warning that
a problem is developing, in contrast to the mark-to-market leverage. A
sensible manager would thus easily avoid bankruptcy by buying less and
avoiding the critical regime.
3.3 Taking noisy impact into account
So far we have focused our attention on the expected impact, which can either
be viewed as the average impact or as a median trajectory. In this section we
show how impact-adjusted accounting can be used to compute the probability
of adverse price movements. This improves on standard measures that fail to
take impact into account and may dramatically underestimate the probability of
bankruptcy in situations where impact is large.
To illustrate this we estimate the probability of bankruptcy for positions of
varying leverage. We make the simple assumption that the noisy component of
impact is independent of the order being executed, and diffuses according to the
volatility as the square root of time. Under the (admittedly crude) approximation
that background price movements are normally distributed we model individual
realizations of price trajectories as a discrete random walk with time varying
drift. For convenience we measure the time t in days. The evolution of the price
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during execution is given by
p(t+ 1) = p(t) + I(Q− q(t)− δq)− I(Q− q(t)) + p0σn(t), (12)
where p(t) is the price at time t, q(t) is the size of the position at time t, and n(t)
is IID gaussian noise. The term I(Q− q(t)− δq)− I(Q− q(t)) is the additional
increment of impact between day t and day t + 1, with δq is the volume traded
in a given day. The total time T needed to off-load the position is T = Q/δq.
With this choice for the stochastic process we ensure that in absence of noise
the price follows the deterministic trajectory predicted by the expected market
impact, and that the price in absence of market impact undergoes an unbiased
discrete random walk. For better risk analysis it is of course possible to use
more sophisticated models of the background noise, incorporating factors such as
clustered volatility, jump diffusions, or heavy tails as desired. The simple model
above is sufficient to illustrate the basic idea of how such risk analysis can be
done.
To assign probabilities for a given event, in this case bankruptcy, we simulate
realizations of the noise process using Eq. (12), keeping σ
√
T small enough that
the probability that the price becomes negative can be neglected. A typical
result is shown in Fig. 3. Since the volatility of the final price scales as σ
√
T ,
whereas the average impact scales as σ
√
Q/V , the sharpness of the transition is
determined by their ratio η ≡ Q/V T . Using T = Q/δq we can write η = δq/V ,
making it clear that η is an aggressivity parameter, often called the participation
rate, measuring the fraction of daily volume used for trading. In Fig. 3 we vary
Q and T while keeping η constant.
The probabilities of bankruptcy are dramatically higher than they are with-
out impact, and as expected, the transition is centered at the critical point
Ic = 3/(2λ0), which is independent of the volatility. The transition is sharp
for aggressive trading schedules (η > 1) and is blurred as η → 0.
During liquidation it is possible for the position to temporarily become bankrupt
and then recover. Whether or not a manager would be forced to default in such a
situation will depend on her relationship with her creditors. Forcing bankruptcy
if it occurs anywhere along the liquidation path slightly raises the probability of
bankruptcy, depending on the time for execution.
4 Does leverage diverge in realistic situations?
We have shown the dangers of mark-to-market accounting for understanding
leverage, but the skeptical reader may wonder whether such extreme situations
actually occur in practice. In this section we plug in some typical numbers and
show that for large positions in illiquid stocks such problems are not uncommon.
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Figure 3: Bankruptcy probability as a function of the total impact I. Probability of
bankruptcy as a function of impact I(Q). In the left panel η = Q/(V T ) = 10; Q is varied
from 0 to 105 while T is varied to hold η constant. Red circles are bankruptcy probability with
impact, and black triangles without impact. The vertical dashed red line is the critical value
Ic. The right panel is a similar plot for three different values of η.
4.1 Impact and bid-ask spread
We have so far computed impact using the estimated volatility and volume. We
now review results that connect these to the spread, which provide an alterna-
tive way to estimate the magnitude of liquidation effects, which might be more
convenient in some circumstances.
It is now well established empirically that the volatility is made up of two
different effects: the size of the bid-ask spread S on the one hand, and the number
of transactions φ per unit time on the other. For liquid markets the volatility σT
on timescale T can be written
σT = bS
√
φT , (13)
where b ≈ 0.6 − 0.9 is a constant of order unity, that weakly depends on the
market [26]. Suppose that the typical volume at the best prices is v. If one
assumes as before that the order is executed in increments of v shares, the total
number of transactions needed to liquidate Q shares is N = Q/v. Similarly the
total volume VT in a time T is VT = vφT . The above impact formula can therefore
be rewritten as:5
I = Y σT
√
Q
VT
= Y b S
√
N, N =
Q
v
. (14)
This expression highlights the micro-structure origin of liquidity. As is intuitively
clear, it is the spread S and the available volume v that determine the impact
cost of a trade. The quantities S and v should again be estimated using moving
averages using market data or broker quotes for OTC/illiquid markets.
5Note that the liquidation time T drops out of the formula, which is one of the remarkable
properties of the square-root impact law.
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4.2 Some examples
Let us first give some orders of magnitude for stock markets. The daily volume
of a typical stock is roughly 5 × 10−3 of its market cap (see e.g. [27, 28]), while
its volatility is of the order 2% per day. Suppose the portfolio to be liquidated
owns Q = 5% of the market cap of a given stock. Taking Y = 0.5, the impact
discount is
I(Q) ≈ 2%×
√
0.05
0.005
≈ 6%. (15)
A 6% hair-cut on the value of a portfolio of very liquid stocks is already quite
large, and it is obviously much larger for less liquid/more volatile markets.
Let us now turn to the question of the critical leverage λc under mark-to-
market accounting. From Section 3, the condition reads:
λcI = 3
2
. (16)
Substituting the two expressions for I = I(Q) and rearranging gives
λc =
3
2Y σ
√
V/Q (17)
=
3
2Y bS
√
N
(18)
To give a feeling for whether or not these conditions can be met, we present
representative values for several different assets. For futures we assume Q = V ,
implying that it would take five days to trade out of the position with η = 0.2.
For stocks we assume Q = 10V , which assuming the same participation rate
implies a position that would take 50 trading days to unwind. Such positions
might seem large, but they do occur for large funds; for instance, Warren Buffet
was recently reported to have taken more than eight months to buy a 5.5% share
of IBM. The results are given in Table 1.
We see that for liquid futures, such as the BUND or SP500, the critical lever-
age is large enough that the phenomenon we discuss here is unlikely to ever
occur. As soon as we enter the world of equities, however, the situation looks
quite different, whereas for OTC market the effect is certainly very real.
5 Conclusion
The above discussion underscores the need to value positions based on liquidation
prices rather than mark-to-market prices. For small, unleveraged positions in
liquid markets there is no problem, but as soon as any of these conditions are
violated, the problem can become severe. As we have shown, standard valuations,
which do nothing to take impact into account, can be wildly over-optimistic.
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Asset σ(daily) V (B$) S(bp) v(M$) I?1 I]2 λc
BUND† 0.4 % 140 1.5 40 0.4% 0.7% ∼ 300
SP500† 1.6% 150 2 10 1.6 % 2.1 % ∼ 100
MSFT♦ 2 % 1.25 3.7 1 6.3 % 3.2 % ∼ 25
AAPL♦ 2.8 % 0.5 1.7 0.1 8.9% 2.9 % ∼ 17
KKR♥ 2.5 % 2♥ 14 2.5♥ 7.9% 9.4 % ∼ 16
ClubMed♣ 4.3 % 1♣ 45 11♣ 13.5 % 8.2 % ∼ 11
CDS[ – – 10 % 10 – 20% ∼ 7.5
Table 1: Numerical values of the different parameters entering the two alternative
impact formulae given in Eqs. (1) and (14) and the corresponding estimates of impact
and critical leverage. Except as otherwise noted, numbers are based on data for the first
quarter of 2008. These are only rough orders of magnitude, intended for a qualitative
discussion. ?: Impact I1 = I(Q) based on volatility and volume, computed with Eq.
(1), with Y = 1 and Q = V for futures and Q = 10V for stocks. This corresponds
to a position of roughly 5% of the market capitalisation on stocks, and to a position
equal to 3 Kerviels on the BUND. ]: Impact computed with Eq. (14), with Y = 1,
b = 0.6− 0.9 (depending on the market [26]) and the same values of Q. †: For futures,
we refer to the nearest maturity; the numbers for the 10YUSNOTE are very similar to
those for the BUND. Note that for liquid futures, the critical leverage level is very high
(as expected). Still, a 1.5% liquidity hair-cut on a position on the SP500 is by no means
negligible. ♦: Large cap US stocks: In this case, Q = 10V . Note that the two impact
estimates are substantially different, with I1 > I2. This maybe due to the fact that
the volume at the best quote, v, is highly skewed, i.e. the typical available volume is
much smaller than the average volume. Furthermore, trades are usually only a fraction
of the available volume. Therefore one expects N > Q/v. We have kept the more
reliable formula Eq. (1) to compute λc. ♥ This is Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, a small
cap US stock. Q = 10V where V is now in M $ and v in thousand $. The numbers
correspond to March 2012. ♣ Club Med is a small cap French stock. Q = 10V , with
V is in M Euros. and v in thousand Euros. The numbers correspond to 2002. [: For
CDS on single names, these are OTC markets for which we only have estimates. Daily
transactions are very patchy and their number is typically in the range 1 − 20. We
have chosen a reasonable value N = Q/v = 10, corresponding to a position of 10 to
100 M$. As expected, liquidity discount and potential deleveraging problems are very
substantial here.
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The solution that we have proposed accomplishes this goal by estimating
liquidation prices based on recent advances in understanding market impact.
The procedures that we suggest have the key virtue of being extremely easy to
implement. They are based on quantities such as volatility, trading volume, or
the spread, that are easy to measure. Risk estimates can be computed for the
typical expected behavior or for the probability of a loss of a given magnitude –
anything that can be done with standard risk measures can be easily replicated
to take impact into account, with little additional effort.
The worst negative side-effects of mark-to-market valuations occur when lever-
age is used. As we have shown here, when liquidity is low leverage can become
critical. By this we mean that as a position is being entered there is a criti-
cal value of the leverage λc above which it becomes very likely that liquidation
will result in bankruptcy, i.e. liquidation value less than money owed to credi-
tors. This does not require bad luck or unusual price fluctuations – it is a nearly
mechanical consequence of using too much leverage.
Standard mark-to-market accounting gives no warning of this problem, in
fact quite the opposite: Impact raises prices as a position is purchased, causing
leverage to be underestimated. However, as a position is unwound the situation
is reversed. The impact of unwinding causes leverage to rise, and if the initial
leverage is critical, the leverage becomes infinite and the position is bankrupt.
Under mark-to-market accounting this comes as a complete surprise. Under
impact-adjusted accounting, in contrast, the warning is clear. As the critical
point is approached the impact-adjusted leverage diverges, telling any sensible
portfolio manager that it is time to stop buying.
The method of valuation that we propose here could potentially be used both
by individual risk managers as well as by regulators. Had such procedures been
in place in the past, we believe that many previous disasters could have been
avoided. As demonstrated in the previous section, the values where leverage
becomes critical are not unreasonable compared to those used before, such as the
leverages of 50 - 100 used by LTCM in 1998, or 30-40 used by Lehman Brothers
and other investment banks in 2008.
However, one should worry about other potentially destabilizing feedback
loops that our impact-adjusted valuation could trigger. For example, in a crisis
situation, spreads and volatilities increase while the liquidity of the market de-
creases, leading to a stronger discount on the asset valuation. But as was the case
during the 2008 crisis, the write-down of the value of some books lead to further
fire-sales, fueling more panic. So it is important to estimate the parameters en-
tering the impact formula (volatility, spread and available volumes) using a slow
moving average to avoid any over-reaction to temporary liquidity draughts.
A key point underlying our discussion here is that market impact occurs
for both informed and uninformed trades. Empirical studies make it clear that
temporary market impact occurs even if trades are made for reasons, such as
hedging or liquidity, that have nothing to do with underlying fundamentals. This
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should not be surprising: Typically the counterparty has no way of knowing
whether the opposite side of the trade is “informed” or “uninformed”6
The failure of mark-to-market accounting can thus be viewed as a failure of
the theory of efficient markets, or at the very least the need to take a liberal view
of what it means. The fact that prices can change substantially due to random
events that have nothing to do with fundamentals reflects a failure of prices to
provide accurate valuations. Alternatively, one can take a generous view of what
the word “accurate” means, as Fisher Black did when he famously said, “we
might define an efficient market as one in which price is within a factor of 2 of
value . . . By this definition I think almost all markets are efficient almost all of
the time. ‘Almost all’ means at least 90%” [29].
The failure of marginal prices as a useful means of valuation is part of an
emerging view of markets as dynamic, endogenously driven and self-referential
[30, 15], as suggested long ago by Keynes [31] and more recently by Soros [32]. For
example, recent studies suggest that exogenous news play a minor role in explain-
ing major price jumps [33], while self-referential feedback effects are strong [34].
Market prices are molded and shaped by trading, just as trading is molded and
shaped by prices, with intricate and sometimes destabilising feedback. Because
the liquidity of markets is so low, the impact of trades is essential to understand
why prices move [11].
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